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EVOLVING TO ASYMPTOMATIC HIV AS A
DISABILITY PER SE: CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE
IN JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
Jason M Metnick*
INTRODUCTION
As of December, 2002, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
("CDC&P") estimated that between 850,000 and 950,000 United States
citizens were infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
("HIV").' Of these persons, roughly 212,500 to 238,500 are unaware
of their HIV status.2 On a worldwide scale, the numbers are
staggering.3 Of the 280 million United States residents in 2002,4 the
number of persons infected with HIV represents a small, but important
fraction of persons who, as a result of tortuous legal reasoning, a short
history of legal understanding, and social stigma face uncertainty in
* B.A. University of Michigan - Ann Arbor, J.D. DePaul University College of law.
'NAT'L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, HIV/AIDS
STATISTICS (Dec. 2002) at http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/aidstat.htm (last visited Mar. 15,
2003) (citing P.L. Fleming, et al., HIV Prevalence in the United States, 9th Conference on
Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections, Abstract 11, Seattle, 2002) [hereinafter HIV/AID
STATS].2Id. This figure represents about one-fourth of all HIV-infected individuals living in the
United States.3See id. The CDC&P estimated that 42 million persons worldwide were infected with
HIV by the end of 2002.4See Annual Projections of the Total Resident Population as of July 1: Middle, Lowest,
Highest Zero International Migration Series, 1999 to 2100, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/summary/np-tl.pdf (last visited March
15, 2003). For lack of a better estimate, I used the middle series of assumptions, which
accounts for fertility, life expectancy, and net immigration. See POPULATION
PROJECTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES BY AGE, SEX, RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN,
AND NATIVITY: 1999 TO 2100, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/summary/np-t.txt (last visited March 15,
2003).
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their classification as "disabled" in accordance with the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 5
In application, the ADA protects most, but not all persons infected
with HIV. This under-inclusive aspect applies solely to certain
asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals, who are included in the group
of more than half of all HIV-infected individuals in the United States.
6
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court's application of the ADA to
asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals, in Bragdon v. Abbott,
represented the largest leap forward in recognition of the debilitating
effects from HIV and affirmed that asymptomatic HIV-infected
individuals can be classified as disabled.7 However, in contravention
of the hope offered after Bragdon, instances of non-application of the
ADA to HIV-infected individuals remain, despite the intent and scope
of the ADA as drafted by Congress and applied by the Supreme Court.
In this essay, I argue that the question of whether HIV infection
substantially limits a major life activity per the ADA is answered with a
resounding "yes," and should not need to be proven by more than a
person's mere status as HIV positive. In Part II, the history and
application of the ADA to asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals is
discussed in order to demonstrate the trend in judicial treatment of
HIV-infected individuals. 8 In Part III, I discuss the legal, medical, and
psychological underpinnings that define the status of asymptomatic
HIV-infected persons. 9  In addition, Part III reasons that all HIV-
infected individuals are disabled under the ADA. In Part IV, I argue
that legal treatment of asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals must
catch up with the scientific and social status of asymptomatic HIV-
infected individuals.' 0 In Part V, I conclude that asymptomatic HIV-
infected individuals should be recognized as disabled per se under the
ADA.
5The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).6The most recent data available at the time this article was written indicated that as of
2001, the CDC&P reported that 362,827 persons were living with AIDS in the United States.
See HIV/AID STATS, supra note 1. Thus, the remainder of persons, when this number is
subtracted from the total number of all persons infected with HIV, equals slightly more than
half of all HIV-infected persons in the United States.
'524 U.S. 624 (1998).
8See infra notes 13-147 and accompanying text.
9See infra notes 148-243 and accompanying text.
l0See infra notes 244-250 and accompanying text.
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I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF HIV STATUS FOR
DISABLED INDIVIDUALS
The precedent of cases in which courts have ruled on the status of HIV-
infected individuals is varied, contradictory, and dynamic, yet, this line
of reasoning has occurred rapidly over a short time. A person is
statutorily disabled if he or she has a record of a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities."
A person with HIV is generally recognized to have a physical
impairment; however, court rulings have wavered on whether to find a
person with HIV to be substantially limited in a major life activity. 12 In
the cases that follow, findings for and against disability status under the
ADA are presented based on differing notions of what the term "major
life activity" means, and when a major life activity is "substantially
limited."
A. Bragdon v. Abbott
The seminal case determining the status of asymptomatic HIV-infected
individuals is Bragdon v. Abbott' 3 Bragdon established the disability
status of asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals under the ADA.'
4
Sidney Abbott was diagnosed with HIV in 1986.15 In 1994, she went
to her dentist, Randon Bragdon, and subsequently discovered that she
had a cavity.' 6 Dr. Bragdon, aware of Ms. Abbott's status, informed
her that he maintained a policy of treating HIV-infected individuals at a
hospital.17 Ms. Abbott declined Dr. Bragdon's offer and instead filed a
lawsuit, alleging that she was discriminated against in contravention of
the ADA.18
"iThe Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12102 (2000).
12See infra notes 13-147 and accompanying text.
1'524 U.S. 624 (1998). Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in which Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined. Justice Stevens also filed a concurring opinion in
which Justice Breyer joined. Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice
Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Scalia
and Thomas. Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part;
Justice O'Connor also joined in part with Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion.
i4Id. at 628, 641. The other major issue before the Court was whether HIV-infected
individuals pose a direct threat to the health and safety of a dentist, the resolution of which did
not affect the Court's finding of disability status for asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals.5Id. at 628.
16Id.
i"Id. at 628-29. Of note, but not much of importance, Dr. Bragdon would have filled Ms.
Abbott's cavity at the hospital at no additional cost, except for fees resulting from use of the
hospital facilities. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629.
18Id.
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In order to determine whether an asymptomatic HIV-infected
person could be defined as disabled under the ADA, the Court
reviewed whether Ms. Abbott had "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limit[ed] one or more of [her] major life activities...
59 In making its determination, the Court promulgated a tripartite
test.20 First, the Court considered "whether [Ms. Abbott's] HIV
infection was a physical impairment." 21  Second, the Court decided
whether the "the life activity upon which [Ms. Abbott] relie[d]
constitute[d] a major life activity under the ADA.' '22 Third, the Court
established "whether the impairment substantially limited the [alleged]
maj or life activity.,2 3
In order to determine whether asymptomatic HIV-infected
individuals have a physical disability, the Court examined the
application of the Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") regulations
to the ADA.24 The HEW regulations contain a non-exhaustive list of
conditions that satisfy the definition of "physical or mental
impairment.9 25 The Court noted how HIV immediately and severely
affects white blood cells following infection.26 In accord with the
general trend of disorders listed in the HEW regulations, the Court
ruled that "HIV infection [fell] well within the general definition...
,27 Specifically, the Court identified the "constant and detrimental
effect on [an] infected person's hemic and lymphatic systems from the
moment of infection.,
28
Under the second factor required for classification as disabled
under the ADA, the Court had to decide whether one of Ms. Abbott's
19 d. at 630 (citing The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(A)
(2000)). The ADA also includes disability categorization for persons who have "a record of
such an impairment" or "being regarded as having such an impairment" See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)(B), (C) (2000).20Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631.21id
221d.
231d.
24 d. at 632-37. The HEW regulations are controlling authority because the Court is
required to provide for at least as much protection for the ADA as under Rehabilitation Act.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631-32; see also 42 U.S.C. 12201(a) (2000).
25Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632. The HEW regulations include at least twenty-two general
categories of conditions that qualify as a physical or mental impairment. See 45 C.F.R. §
84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997). Additional categories of more specific ailments (i.e. cancer, epilepsy, and
diabetes) are included in a final analysis and commentary of the HEW regulations. See
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 633; see also 45 C.F.R. pt. A, app. A (1997).
26Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 633-37.
27Id. at 633.28Id. at 637.
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major life activities was impaired.29 The Court restricted its inquiry to
whether reproduction qualified as a major life activity.30  The Court
applied the definition of major life activity as used by the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, affirming that "'major denotes
comparative importance' and 'suggest[s] that the touchstone for
determining an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is its
significance." ' 31 The Court held that reproduction qualified as a major
life activity. 32 As with the first factor, the Court's holding with regard
to the second required factor under the ADA was consistent with the
intent and construction of the Rehabilitation Act.
33
Under the third factor required for classification as disabled under
ADA, the Court had to decide whether the physical impairment due to
asymptomatic HIV infection substantially limited Ms. Abbott's ability
to reproduce. 34 The Court noted two reasons that contributed to finding
HIV substantially limited Ms. Abbott's ability to reproduce. 35  The
Court cited the incidence of transmission of HIV from females to males
and mothers to offspring via perinatal transmission. 36  These acts
presented risks of transmission ranging between twenty and twenty-five
percent, respectively. 37  In face of contradictory statistical evidence
presented by the United States (acting as amicus curiae), the Court
ruled that even an eight percent "risk of transmitting a dread and fatal
disease" could support a finding of a substantial limitation on a major
life activity. 3
8
In sum, the Bradgon Court found that as in Ms. Abbott's
circumstance, an asymptomatic HIV-infected individual qualified for
protected status as disabled under the ADA. Of importance, the Court
made its finding without reaching the question of whether
asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals are disabled per se, thus
leaving the question open to consideration based on the specifics of
each asymptomatic HIV-infected individual.39
29See supra notes 19 and 21 and accompanying text.30Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.311d. at 638 (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939-40 (1st Cir. 1997).32Id. In injudicious wording, the majority opinion stated "reproduction and the sexual
dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself." Id. (emphasis added).33See id at 638-39; see also 28 C.F.R. § 41.3 1(b)(2) (1997) for a list of illustrative major
life activities.34Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.35See infra notes 36 - 38 and accompanying text.361d. at 639-40.
371d. The Court cited several scientific studies to make this determination.
381d. at 641.
391d. at 641-42.
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B. Cases Following Bragdon
In Bragdon's aftermath, the issue of whether asymptomatic HIV-
infected individuals are disabled per se has been left unaddressed. The
scope of this issue, however, entails three inquiries into an individual's
disabled status.40  Therefore, even though the overall issue remains
undecided, the factors that constitute the issue have been addressed
piecemeal, which lead to the legal conclusion that asymptomatic HIV-
infected individuals should be considered disabled per se.
1. The Trilogy: Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Albertson's v. Kirkingburg
In a series of three cases decided on June 22, 1999, the United States
Supreme Court squarely ruled on the status of various individuals with
mitigating circumstances who each claimed disability status under the
ADA.4
a. Sutton v. United Air Lines
In Sutton, the question presented was whether an individual's disability
should be measured with reference to mitigating or corrective
measures.42 The petitioners in Sutton suffered from "severe myopia,"
when uncorrected, left them incapable of performing simple, everyday
tasks.43 The Court held that the correct interpretation of the ADA
included taking into consideration "the effects of [corrective] measures
- both positive and negative ... when judging whether [a] person is
'substantially limited' in a major life activity."44
To reach its conclusion, the Court cited three principles. First, the
Court construed the language of the ADA to require "'a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities' of an individual. 45  According to the Court, a person
who can correct a physical or mental impairment is not substantially
40See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.4 1Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
4"Sutton, 527 U.S. at 458. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Breyer. In addition, Justice Breyer wrote a
separate dissenting opinion.
43Id. The Court noted that the petitioners (who, incidentally are twin sisters) were unable
to "driv[e] a vehicle, watch[] television or shop[]" without corrective lenses. Id.
44Id. at 482.
4 5
1d.
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46limited in a major life activity. Second, the court cited the
"individualized inquiry" that is required, per Bragdon.47 Under this
construct, it does not follow that if an individual fits within a broad
category of disabled persons, then that person necessarily acquires or
48demonstrates all the debilitating qualities of that category. 48 The Court
did not consider all individuals within a group to tend toward the
theoretical mean, but rather, considered one's individual merits despite
such categorization. 49 The Court affirmed that the ADA does not treat
a diagnosis synonymously with the effect of a diagnosis; disabilit y
determinations are made based on an "individual's actual condition."
Third, the Court noted a Congressional policy to circumscribe the scope
of the reach of the ADA: "Congress did not intend to bring under the
statute's protection all those whose uncorrected conditions amount to
disabilities." 51  Applying these three principles, the Sutton Court
concluded that the respondents were not disabled under the ADA.52
In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens posited that the clauses of the
ADA should be read as meant to include persons who in the past or
present that have "a substantially limiting impairment are covered by
the Act.",53 Justice Stevens proffered amputees to demonstrate his rule
of thumb.54 He explained that a person with a prosthesis is not
"cured., 55 Such an individual remains limited in major life activities
despite mitigating his or her disability. In Stevens's view, a functional
limitation on an individual does not avoid the existence of a disability,
whether cured or persistent.
56
b. Murphy v. United Parcel Service
The Murphy Court faced the same issue as in Sutton, except the
petitioner's malady in Murphy was not a superficial physical
46Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83.471Id. at 483.
4 8See id.49The Court exemplified this theory using diabetes. Left unaided, diabetics would
become severely ill, whereas diabetics who monitor their blood sugar levels live relatively
normal lives. Id.
50 d"51Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484.52This conclusion resolves the respondents' claim of disability under The Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Respondents also claimed disability status
under 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(C), alleging that they were "regarded as having such an
impairment." See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C); see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.53Sutton, 527 U.S. at 497.54 d. at 497-98.
55Id. at 498.
56Id. at 499.
20031
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impairment. 57 The petitioner in Murphy sought disability status with
regard to his hypertension, a condition not permitted for his job as a
United Parcel Service mechanic. 58  As in Sutton, the Court had to
determine whether to consider the petitioner's condition in its treated or
untreated state for disability determinations under the ADA.59
Following its decision in Sutton, the Court held that the petitioner's
medicated condition was appropriate for ADA determinations. 60 Of
note, the Court did not address "whether [the] petitioner is disabled
when taking medication. . . [or] ... whether petitioner is 'disabled' due
to limitations that persist despite his medication or the negative side
effects of his medication." 61 Rather, the Court's inquiry was limited to
whether mitigating measures are relevant when considering a disabled
person's limitation on a major life activity. 62  As in Sutton, Justice
Stevens dissented, claiming that severe hypertension "in its
unmedicated state" made the petitioner disabled under the ADA.63
c. Albertson 's v. Kirkinzbur'
On certiorari from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit's finding of disability status for an individual with
uncorrectable monocular vision, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit Court's decision. 64  The plaintiff in
Kirkingburg suffered from amblyopia, which left him with monocular
vision.65 Albertson's fired Mr. Kirkingburg because he could not meet
the Department of Transportation's vision standards. 66
The Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit's finding of
disability was flawed for three reasons. 67  First, the Ninth Circuit
properly reduced the "significant restriction" qualification per the
ADA's "substantial limitation" requirement to a "mere difference"
standard.68 Second, the Ninth Circuit failed to account for factors that
57Murphy, 527 U.S. at 518.
5 Id. at 518-19.
591d. at 521.60 d. Note that both Sutton and Murphy were cases on certiorari from the United States
Court of Appeal for the Tenth Circuit. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th
Cir. 1997); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998).
61Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.62
1d.
63Id. at 525.
64Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 558-78.
65Id. at 559. Kirkingburg's amblyopia caused him to have 20/200 vision in his left eye,
leaving him with essentially monocular vision.
661d. at 561.
67See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
68Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565.
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mitigated Mr. Kirkingburg's condition.69  This aspect of the Court's
analysis differed from that in both Sutton and Murphy because the
compensation to Kirkingburg's disability was a "learned . . .
subconscious adjustment., 70  The Court made no distinction between
this sort of mitigating factor and those made with physical aids or
medication. 71 Third, the Kirkingburg Court re-emphasized the
necessity to examine each case of disability without regard to an
individual's classification within a group of disabled persons.72 The
Court found that Kirkingburg, although likely disabled, still must prove
his disability according to these criteria.
73
2. Cases Distinguishing Bragdon and Comparing
the "Substantially Limits" and "Major Life Activity" Requirements
Apart from the issue of whether mitigation of a disability disqualifies a
person as disabled,74 decisions after Bragdon have considered the
activities that may qualify as a major life activity under the Bragdon
Court's rubric. Few cases have focused directly on whether
asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals are disabled per se;75 most
courts, however, distinguish or compare the facts of a case to the facts
in Bragdon. The crux of the issue of whether a disability has
substantially limited a major life activity necessarily depends on a
court's definition of the terms: "substantially limits" and "major life
activity," both of which are undefined in the ADA.76 The application
of various definitions of these terms can lead to dubious results and
raise questions as to the logical conclusion a court would reach based
on a different set of facts using the same definitions.
69Id"
701d.
71id.721d. at 566. The Court also restated its position from Bragdon, that "some impairments
may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity." Id.73Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 567.74See supra notes 40 - 73 and accompanying text.75See e.g., Gutwaks v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 3:98-CV-2120-BF, 1999 WL
1611328 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 1999); Blanks v. Southwestern Bell Communications, Inc., 310
F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002), discussed infra notes 139-148 and accompanying text. United States
v. Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (W.D. Wisc. 1998), is the rare example of a case
where the court examined the per se application to HIV infection under the ADA. Happy Time
Day Care, however, was decided before the Supreme Court decided Bragdon.
76See The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 12101-12102 (2000).
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a. Applications of the term "Substantially Limits" under the ADA
i. Gonzales v. National Board of Medical Examiners
In Gonzales v. National Board of Medical Examiners,77 the appellant,
Michael Gonzalez, claimed that his writing disability substantially
limited his major life activities of reading, writing, and working. 78 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit used the term
"substantially limits" as used in the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
regulations.79 Per the DOJ regulations, a person is substantially limited
"when the individual's important life activities are restricted as to the
condition[s], manner, or duration under which they can be performed in
comparison to most people." 80 Using the DOJ and Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regulations as guidance, the court
compared Mr. Gonzales's performance to the performance of "most
people." 81 Medical doctors who tested Mr. Gonzales's performance
reported the results of standardized psychological and general aptitude
tests. 82  Mr. Gonzales's performance, when compared to a normal
distribution of the general population, revealed that he performed in a
range from average to above average. 83  Of importance, the court
refused to use a population of similarly situated persons (in this case,
second-year medical students) as a basis for the general population with
which to compare Mr. Gonzales. 84  Instead, the court used the
distribution of all persons within the general population against which
to measure Gonzales's limitation.85 Therefore, the court held that Mr.
Gonzales's impairments did not substantially limit his ability to read,
write, or to work
86
"7225 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2000).
7 Id. at 627.
791d. at 626-27.
801d. at 627 (citing 28 C.F.R., pt. 36, app. B (2000)). The court also cited the definition of
"substantially limited" as defined by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") as when a person is either:
"unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population in the general population [or] significantly restricted as
to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform
a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the average person can perform that same major life
activity."
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(2000)(internal quotations omitted)).8
'Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 627.821d. at 627-30.
3Id. at 627-29.
4Id. at 631-32.
851d.
"Id. at 630-32.
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ii. Felix v. New York Transit Authority
In Felix v. New York Transit Authority,87 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York explored the temporal
aspect of whether a major life activity is substantially limited. 88 The
court viewed the plaintiffs, Ms. Felix's, limitation with respect to
EEOC regulations, namely, "(i) the nature and severity of the
impairment; (ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment;
and (iii) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent
or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." 89 Ms. Felix
suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome, resulting in severe
insomnia lasting for four years.9° Although "this condition was not
permanent, it was of sufficient duration to qualify as an ADA
impairment." 91 While two of the three EEOC considerations refer to
duration, the court spent little effort to explain its satisfaction with the
duration and long-term effects of Ms. Felix's limitation.92 The four
year limitation interval on a major life activity was simply described as
"sufficient." 93  Thus, while not divulging its view on the impact
attributed solely to the durational effect of Ms. Felix's condition, the
court held that a "chronic inability to sleep was a substantial limitation
of a major life activity." 94
iii. Furnish v. SVI Systems, Inc.
In a review of organ function as a disability under the ADA, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined in Furnish v.
SVI Systems, Inc.95  whether cirrhosis of the appellant's liver
substantially limited a major life activity.96 The court applied a three-
factored test to make its determination. 97 The court considered "the
nature and severity of the impairment; the duration of the impairment;
and the permanent or long-term impact resulting from the
impairment." 98 The court found that the appellant's impairment was
87154 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
88See id.89 d. at 654 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.26)(1998)).
9°Id. at 654.
91 d.92Felix, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 654.
931Id. at 654. The court wrote more extensively on the severity and nature of Ms. Felix's
impairment. See id.94
Id.
95270 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2001).
96Id. at 450.
97Id.
981d. (citing Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 506 n.3 (7th Cir. 1998).
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slight, citing a doctor's diagnosis stating that Mr. Furnish's liver
functioned "as well as you can do with cirrhosis." 99  The court
additionally found that the appellant's impairment was of short or
limited duration because medication had caused his condition to
subside. 100 Lastly, the court found that the appellant would not likely
suffer long-term effects as a result of his cirrhosis. 1 1  Therefore,
because these three factors tended to disprove a substantially limiting
effect from an impairment, the court held that the appellant's cirrhosis
of the liver "did not substantially limit his liver function."'
0 2
iv. Contreras v. Suncast Corporation
In a variation on a claim of sexual dysfunction as a disability under the
ADA, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found
in Contreras v. Suncast Corp. 103 that a decrease in sexual behavior does
not substantially limit a major life activity. 1°4 Mr. Contreras's claim
that his decreasing ability to engage in sexual intercourse from twenty
times a month to twice a month did not constitute a substantial
limitation, because Mr. Contreras's assertion was not supported with
documentation.1°5 As a result of the lack of such documentation, the
court held that sexual relations would need to be documented by more
than "a general assertion."
'106
v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams
More recently, the United States Supreme Court ruled on the correct
meaning of the phrase "substantially limits" in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing v. Williams.10 7 The Court declared that "'substantially'
in the phrase 'substantially limits' suggests 'considerable' or to a large
degree."' 0 8  This intendment "clearly precludes impairments that
interfere in only a minor way" with major life activities.' 9 The Court
considered the limitation and permanence an impairment places on a
person's major life activity.'' 0 The Court also noted the individualistic
99 d. at 451.
'°°Furnish, 270 F.3d at 451.
101d
102Id.
103237 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2001).
'04m. at 764.
10 5
1d.
106
Id.
'07534 U.S. 184 (2002).
'Id. at 196.
'
09
.d at 197.
"Om. at 198.
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nature of a substantial limitation, and required a claimant to present
more than cursory proof of a diagnosis of a condition. 1 In Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Ms. Williams was incapable of "repetitive work
with [her] hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for
extended periods of time."'1 12 Despite the extensive discussion of the
aforementioned process to determine whether a major life activity had
been "substantially limited," the Court found without explanation that
the Ms. William's carpal tunnel syndrome and related manual
impairments did not substantially limit her ability to engage in a major
life activity.113 Of note, the Court did not focus on the severity or
lasting effect of Ms. Williams's impairment, but rather, it commingled
the substantially limiting requirement with the major life activity
requirement. 
1 4
b. Applications of the term "Major Life Activity" under the ADA
i. Furnish v. SVI Systems, Inc.
In addition to deciding the substantially limiting effect of the
appellant's disability in Furnish v. SVI Systems, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit court also considered whether liver function was a major life
activity. 115 Although the court conceded that liver dysfunction caused
by Hepatitis B and chronic cirrhosis of the liver was a physical
impairment, it did not find that it impacted a major life activity. 1Z The
court cited the examples listed by the EEOC as typical of the activities
considered to be major life activities, including: "caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working." 117  Comparing this list with the appellant's
condition, the court found that "'liver function' bears little resemblance
to the major life activities enunciated in the ADA regulations."' 18
Extending the Court's reasoning in Bragdon,, the Furnish court
11 1d
. 
The Court cited Kirkingburg for the proposition that an individual must "prove a
disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused by their impairment] in
terms of their own experience . . .is substantial." Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 534 U.S. at
198; see supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text for a full explanation of the Court's holding
in Kirkingburg.
"
2 d. at 201.
13 Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 534 U.S. at 201.114See id. at 201. Presumably, the Court emphasized the "substantially limits"
requirement in Toyota Motor Manufacturing to clarify the inapplicability of class treatment to
major life activities apart from the sole exception of working as a major life activity. See id. at
196-201.
"'Furnish, 270 F.3d at 449.
1161d. The Seventh Circuit's court's reasoning was somewhat circuitous in this aspect.
'
17Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1998)).
1181d.
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explained its finding based on the daily necessity of the allegedly
impaired activity.119 In the court's view, "although liver function is
'integral to one's daily existence,"' in the common sense, it is not
integral to one's daily existence as dictated by the Supreme Court in
Bragdon.120  The Furnish court made the distinction that "[t]he
activities that have been held to be major life activities under the ADA.
. are not the impairments' characteristics-they are activities that have
been impacted because of the plaintiffs' impairments."' 12 1 Therefore,
because the Furnish court required separation of an impairment and the
affected activity, it found that liver function did not constitute a major
life activity.
122
ii. Gutwaks v. American Airlines, Inc.
In Gutwaks v. American Airlines, Inc.,12 3 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas considered whether
reproduction constituted a major life activity for an unmarried man. 124
Mr. Gutwaks claimed that his HIV-positive status constituted a
disability under the ADA. 12 5  Moreover, Mr. Gutwaks claimed that
because he was infected with HIV that his major life activity of
reproduction was substantially limited.126 The court focused on Mr.
Gutwaks's willingness to reproduce. 127  Citing Mr. Gutwaks's
admission that "he does not currently, nor has he ever, desired to father
children," the court found that reproduction did not constitute a major
life activity for Mr. Gutwaks.12  Distinguishing Bragdon from the
present case, the court opined that "the plaintiff in Bragdon testified
that her HIV status dictated her decision not to have children" whereas
Mr. Gutwaks's decision not to have children "was a personal one." 1
29
119 d
120Furnish, 270 F.3d at 449-50.
"'Id. at 450.
122 d. The court further clarified its holding, stating, "Only when the impact of the illness
substantially limits a major life activity-such as working-is an individual considered
disabled within the meaning of the ADA." Id.123No. 3:98-CV-2120-BF, 1999 WL 1611328 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 1999).
124The formal opinion does not explicitly state Mr. Gutwaks's sexual orientation; rather,
Mr. Gutwaks alleged "there was gossip about his sexual orientation." The court's holding,
however, is not limited solely to homosexual men. Id. at * 1.
'
251d at * 1.
26 d. at *4.
1271d
128 d. at *4. The court compared the facts in Gutwaks to the facts in Quails v. Lack
Stores, Inc., No. 5:98-CV-149-C, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5731 (N.D. Tex. 1999), a case in
which a claim of reproduction as a major life activity failed for a Hepatitis C-positive man who
no longer wished to conceive children with his wife. Id. at *5.129Gutwaks, 1999 WL 1611328, at *4.
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Furthermore, the court refused Mr. Gutwaks claim of per se disability
status due to his full blown AIDS status.' 3
0
iii. Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams
Following both Furnish and Gutwaks, the Toyota Motor Manufacturing
Court further refined the definition of a major life activity.131 The
Court declared that "'[m]ajor in the phrase 'major life activity' means
important. ' 132  The Court also recognized that activities that are
regarded as "central" to the daily life of a general population are major
life activities. 33 The issue posed in Toyota Motor Manufacturing was
whether certain manual tasks fit within the definition of a major life
activity. 134  In order to decide whether multiple separate tasks
constituted a major life activity, the Court promulgated a rule that
allowed it to look at the effect in the aggregate.' 35 The Court defined
the test as an inquiry: "If each of the tasks included in the major life
activity of performing manual tasks does not independently qualify as a
major life activity, then together they must do so."'' 36  Here, Ms.
Williams claimed that she was limited in her ability in several respects,
including: "manual tasks; housework; gardening; playing with her
children; lifting; and working," which thereby established her disability
in the performance of manual tasks.' 37  The Court held that in the
aggregate, "these changes in her life did not amount to such severe
restrictions in the activities that are of central importance to most
people's daily lives that they establish a manual task disability as a
matter of law."'' 38 Per Toyota Motor Manufacturing, even many minor
limitations might not establish the existence of a disability unless the
court is persuaded that those minor limitations constitute an overall
disability in a recognized major life activity.
1301d. at *5. The court concluded that "whether Gutwaks' alleged disability is his HIV
positive status or full blown AIDS, he has failed to convince this Court that he is disabled under
the ADA." Id.
13'Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 534 U.S. at 197.132 Id.
1331d. Furthermore, the Court distinguished the tasks which are central to most people's
lives and those tasks associated with a claimant's "specific job." Id. at 200.
1341d. The Court included basic activities in this category, such as "walking, seeing, and
hearing." Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 534 U.S. at 197.
135Id.136id.
137Id. at 190.
138Id. at 202.
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3. The "Loophole" - Blanks v. Southwestern Bell
In an opinion issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, an asymptomatic HIV-positive employee, Mr. Blanks, was
denied disability status under the ADA. 139  The Fifth Circuit court
acknowledged that "asymptomatic HIV qualifies as a physical
impairment from the moment of infection."' 140  In addition, the court
noted that HIV infection "substantially limits the major life activity of
reproduction."' 141 Using these edicts, the court posed its finding on
whether "an HIV-positive person [can] show[] he or she is substantially
limited in the major life activity of reproduction ... 042
Although Mr. Blanks was HIV-positive, and thus, had a physical
impairment, he did not satisfy the substantial life limitation requirement
of the ADA.143 Of importance to the Fifth Circuit Court, Mr. Blanks
testified that he and his wife did not intend to have any more
children. 14 4 Using its stated paradigm, the court found that Mr. Blanks
did "not raise a triable issue of fact to indicate that his HIV status
substantially limited his major life activity of reproduction.' 45
Although Blanks did not allege that he was disabled in any other major
life activity, the court could have considered whether Blanks was
limited in the major life activity of working. 146 However, a finding of a
major life activity impairment in working would likely have been
unsuccessful because Blanks wanted to work and had requested to
perform any job Southwestern Bell could offer him at the same
salary. 147  In sum, Mr. Blanks's inability to prove that he was
substantially impaired in the major life activity of reproduction, and his
likely estoppel from claiming that he was substantially impaired in the
139Blanks v. Southwestern Bell Communications, Inc., 310 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002). I
consider Gutwaks v. American Airlines, No. 3:98-CV-2120-BF, 1999 WL 1611328 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 2, 1999), also to be part of the "loophole," but have chosen Blanks as my primary
example for both its factual clarity and its recent publication.
140 d. at 401 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637).
1411d
1421d.
1431d. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three
Bragdon factors required for disability status under The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C § 12102(2)(A), as opposed to disability status under subsections § 12102(2)(B) and (C).
'44Blanks, 310 F.3d at 401. Mr. Blanks' wife was incapable of having children. Id.
145id.
146Id. The court defined the major life activity of working as follows: "one must be
'significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and
abilities."' Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(1998)).
14'Blanks, 310 F.3d at 401.
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major life activity of working precluded him from claiming disability
status under the ADA despite his asymptomatic HIV-positive status.
148
III. ANALYSIS
The analysis that follows takes a developmental path, beginning with
an examination of the "substantially limits" and "major life activity"
requirements and examples of their application in the HIV context.
The focus then shifts to a separate analysis of how medical evidence
pertaining to HIV infection can support a claim for disability under the
ADA.' 50  Finally, a third analysis demonstrates how certain
psychological evidence can support a claim for disability under the
ADA. 1
51
14 8 Id.
149See infra notes 153-202 and accompanying text.
'
5
°See infra notes 205-225 and accompanying text.
5'5 See infra notes 226-242 and accompanying text. Although I treat the "substantially
limiting" and "major life activity" requirements separately for analytic purposes, the analyses
are not entirely made by independent considerations. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit recognized the unclear distinction between these requirements exists in
some cases because "'substantially limited' and 'major life activity' are interrelated and should
not be treated as two separate criteria, particularly when the major life activity implicated
encompasses a broad range of lesser activities, such as learning or working." Knapp v.
Northwestern University, 101 F.3d 473, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1996).
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A. Legal Analysis: Interpretation and Application of the
Substantially Limits and Major Life Activity Requirements
1. Applying the Substantially Limits Requirement: Reproduction 
15 2
The factors to which a court applies facts can be diagrammed on a
continuum, and then each factor is weighted individually. This would
appear as follows:
Diagram 1: Plaintiff's Scaled Deviation from a General Ponulation
General
Population
Nature & Severity of Impairment
Duration or Expected Duration of Impairment - Plaintiff's
_" 1- Deviation from
Expected Long-Term Impact from Impairment General Population
0 0 153
Each deviation is then converted into a sum, appearing as a triangle:
Diagram 2: Summation of Deviations
Nature & Severity of Impairment
Duration or Expected Duration of Impairment Expected Long-Term Impact from Impairment
Thus, the resultant sum of factors visually means that the more
distorted the resultant triangle, the more severe the impairment. For
example, a person with average deviation from a general population
with regard to all three factors forms an equilateral triangle and
represents perfect unison with a general population (Diagram 2,
152The "substantially limits" requirement is also applied to several other major life
activities in Section A.2 of this Part as well as in Sections 1II.B and III.C of this article.
153These endpoints change as deviation changes on each measure.
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supra).154 In such an example, a substantially limiting impairment does
not result.' 
55
The Bragdon Court found two ways in which an HIV-infected
woman was substantially limited in the activity of reproduction: first,
by the risk of transmission of HIV to her sexual partner, and second, by
the risk of transmission of HIV posed to her child.156 Although the
Bragdon court did not explicitly mention the factors in Diagrams 1 and
2, supra, its analysis of the substantial limitation on reproduction
predominately featured aspects of those factors.
The nature and severity of HIV on reproduction is serious and
weighty, because transmission may occur despite attempts at
mitigation. Following the ruling in Bragdon, even a very low
probability of transmitting HIV to others constitutes a substantial
limitation on reproduction. 57  The duration of a limitation on
reproduction lasts as long as a person is physically capable of
reproducing. Although an HIV-infected person is capable of engaging
in reproduction, he or she cannot do so without posing some risk to
partners or offspring, or both. The expected long-term impact from
reproducing while having HIV is spreading HIV. On an individual
level, the effect of transmitting HIV is illness, suffering, and death to
the recipient. On a world-wide scale, the spread of HIV poses serious
risks to the entire human population. Thus, it is apparent even from
this cursory application of the triumvirate of factors considered for the
requirement of a substantial limitation (and listed in Diagram 2, supra)
that an HIV-infected person cannot reproduce without grave
consequences. It follows that these consequences deviate significantly
compared to the resultant obtained by persons in a normal population
who engage in reproduction.
Perhaps the divergent outcomes in Bragdon, Gutwaks, and Blanks
can be explained through the fiction of a presumption of a future
activity. The Bragdon Court considered the fate of a female, who,
through her natural ability, retains the inherent power to carry and bear
a child. From an etiological perspective, HIV would more directly
15 4Of course, a person who deviates greatly, but equally, with regard to all 3 factors
would also generate an equilateral triangle, but in such a case, the person would obviously be
disabled. The use of summing deviations is to visualize cases that are less apparent.
155Diagrammatically, based on the measures in Diagram 1, the triangles in Diagram 2
would be isosceles, scalene, or obtuse, reflecting a theoretical disharmony with a normal
population.
156Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639-40.
157See generally Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641 (finding that an eight percent risk of
transmission is a substantial limitation on reproduction).
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affect the probability of transmission to her child. 158 Conversely, the
Gutwaks and Blanks courts had to consider the fate of an HIV-infected
male, who without a female, cannot carry and bear a child. Thus, the
transmission of HIV via reproduction necessarily would rely on a
hypothetical third person who, in turn, could transmit the disease to
offspring. 159 That Gutwaks and Blanks would require an extension
from the plaintiff claiming disability to this hypothetical third person
might help to reconcile the divergent outcomes in these cases.
Focusing on this difference, however, is an abstraction of the reality
that neither opinion in either Gutwaks or Blank claimed that
transmission to children factored into the court's holdings.
Another aspect that cannot be overlooked is the line of reasoning
standing for the proposition that mitigation of disabilities renders an
individual not disabled. 160 Of importance, the Murphy Court found that
medication could reduce a condition of hypertension to the point where
it no longer represented a disability.' 6' There is a distinction to be
made, though, between a condition like hypertension and HIV
infection: HIV infection even in its medicated state is still disabling,
whereas hypertension is not. Although this distinction is slight, it is not
merely convenient for this essay. Congress has recorded its intent that
under the ADA, "persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or
diabetes, which substantially limit a major life activity are covered
under the first prong of the definition of disability, even if the effects of
the impairment are controlled by medication."' 6  As discussed later in
this essay, HIV treatment itself is often debilitating, despite one's
asymptomatic status. 163 Moreover, Congress hinted at the inherent line
drawing that might be necessary when considering disabilities that are
mitigated by medication, stating that, when mitigating measures
"would result in a less-than-substantial limitation," a disability should
be assessed in its original state.' 64 Recognizing the severely impairing
effect of HIV, HIV infection is arguably comparable to epilepsy and
diabetes.
5
'See id. at 640.
1591n Blanks, the hypothetical third person is actual, she is Mr. Blanks's wife.
160See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
161See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
162H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990).
163See infra notes 211-226 and accompanying text.
164H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990).
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Moreover, like epilepsy and diabetes, which are both unmentioned
in the language of the ADA, HIV also is not listed. The ADA was
drafted to be flexible; Congress recognized that:
It [was] not possible to include in the legislation a list of all
the specific conditions, diseases, or infections that would
constitute physical or mental impairments because of the
difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of such a list,
particularly in light of the fact that new disorders may
develop in the future.
165
Although it is not listed as a disabling condition, HIV infection is
severely life-limiting, causing limitations in life activities.
It is worth noting, that for reasons of over-inclusiveness, life itself
cannot be claimed as a major life activity, or else any activity could be
a potential disability. For HIV-infected persons, reproduction,
dysfunction of internal bodily functions in the aggregate, the sexual
dynamics surrounding reproduction, and the ability to care for one's
self are all possible major life activities. For an HIV-infected person,
the substantially limiting factors pertaining to these major life activities
deviate greatly when compared to most of the disabling effects of
persons living with other diseases as well as to the lifestyle of a normal
population. The extent to which dysfunction of internal bodily
functions in the aggregate, the sexual dynamics surrounding
reproduction, and the ability to care for one's self are substantially
limited is addressed later in this essay in order to demonstrate the effect
on each life activity in the context of HIV.
2. Applying the Major Life Activity Requirement
Court rulings in favor of and against certain major life activities are
inconsistent. In the following sections, three different arguments for
inclusion of certain activities as major life activities are recommended.
The first proposed argument (which was also the main impetus for this
article) is that reproduction ought to constitute a major life activity for
all persons who are capable of reproducing.' 66 The second argument
proposes that internal bodily functions contribute to a major life
activity, in the aggregate, under certain circumstances.' 6  The third
165Id. at 5 1.
166See infra notes 173-190 and accompanying text.167See infra notes 191-203 and accompanying text.
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argument states that the sexual dynamics surrounding reproduction are
a major life activity. 168
As a primer to the discussion of major life activities, the definition
of the term "major" is briefly addressed here. Under the ADA, the
Supreme Court has found that the scope of "major" life activities is not
limited solely to "those aspects of a person's life which have a public,
economic, or daily character."' 169 Moreover, "[n]othing in the [ADA]
suggests that activities without a public, economic, or daily dimension
may somehow be regarded as so unimportant or insignificant as to fall
outside the meaning of the word 'major."", 170 Therefore, the ADA does
not preclude activities based solely on categorization, but rather, any
activity that rises to the same relative level of importance as other
recognized activity is treated equably. The Toyota Motor
Manufacturing Court extended the definition of "major" in major life
activity to include a pooled number of tasks that do not independently
qualify as "major," but when taken together, constitute a major life
activity. 171 Generally, "'major' means important.' 172
a. Reproduction is a Major Life Activity for All Persons Capable of
Reproducing
i. Reproduction is a Comparatively "Major" Life Activity
The inclusion of reproduction as a major life activity was met with
criticism by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Bragdon.173 One commentator
reduced the Bragdon Court's comparative analysis to a normal
population, based on whether "an activity [is] performed by the
majority of the population at any one time." 17 4 A determination of
major life activities based on whether a majority of the population is
engaged in such activity at any given time misses the point. Assigning
parameters according to a majority rule in this instance is akin to a
reconstruction of the public, economic, and daily designations that the
Supreme Court explicitly overruled in Bragdon.175 While it is true that
168See infra notes 204-210 and accompanying text.
169Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638; see id. at 639 (equating the relative significance of
reproduction to working and learning).
7
'Id. at 638.
17'Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 534 U.S. at 197; see also supra notes 107-111 and
accompanying text.
172Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 534 U.S. at 197.
17 3Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 657-64.1 74Christiana M. Ajalat, Is HIV Really a "Disability"?: The Scope of the Americans with
Disabilities Act After Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
751, 763 (1999).
175See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text.
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a majority of the population will not experience a failure to reproduce
at a given time, as proposed by the same commentator, 176 one could
argue that a failure of any major life activity is never experienced by an
entire population at a given time. If failure of an activity were the rule,
then the ADA would cover few disabling conditions; however, this is
not the case.
The commentator advanced a second reason against finding HIV
as part of a "major" life activity, namely, that HIV infection does not
prevent an individual from participating in "mainstream American
life. ' '177 Without delving into a lengthy diatribe on the American way
of life, it is sufficient to note that reproduction has been, currently is,
and will continue to be part of human life, so long as there is human
life. As shown in Sections A.2.b and A.2.c of this Part as well as in
Parts III.B and III.C, HIV infection does prevent individuals from
enjoying life activities when compared to a normal population. 78
ii. Reproduction is a Life Activity
That courts find that some people have a major life activity of
reproduction and other courts do not is circumspect. 179 Comparing the
facts in Bragdon to those in both Gutwaks and Blanks reveals that
distinctions were made in the latter cases based on superficial
differences not present in Bragdon. In Bragdon, Chief Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that Ms. Abbott never posited that she was
substantially limited in the major life activity of reproduction.' 80
Rehnquist asserted that "when asked during her deposition whether her
HIV infection had in any way impaired her ability to carry out any of
her life functions, [Ms. Abbott] answered 'No."" 8' In addition, there
was no evidence presented that Ms. Abbott had any inclination to have
children, or that her HIV infection had forced her to make a decision
not to have children.' 82 Nevertheless, the Court inferred from these
facts that a woman with HIV infection could be substantially limited in
the major life activity of reproduction, regardless of whether Ms.
176See Ajalat, supra note 174 at 763.1771d. at 763.
1781 have been careful here to use the term "normal population" to reflect both a majority
and minority of a population.
179Compare e.g. Bragdon with Blanks and Gutwaks. More precisely, people who are
equally capable of engaging in reproduction have been found both to have and not to have the
major life activity of reproduction.
18°Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 659. Chief Justice Rehnquist also took issue with whether Ms.
Abbott was substantially limited in her ability to reproduce. See id. at 660-61.
18 1 d"
18 2
Id.
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Abbott was in fact limited. 183  In contrast, the inference reached in
Gutwaks and Blanks was that a man infected with HIV who admits that
he has no intention to reproduce cannot be substantially limited in the
major life activity of reproduction.' 84 If courts are to treat all plaintiffs
equally, then all plaintiffs should have the same set of major life
activities. Major life activities supposedly define one's daily essential
existence,' 85 and should not vary from person to person.
186
One way to differentiate Bragdon from Gutwaks and Blanks is to
examine the courts' reliance on the objective and subjective intent of
plaintiffs. According to these cases, the objective, but unverifiable
intent of a plaintiff demands the outcome of whether a major life
activity exists. For example, in Gutwaks, the plaintiff admitted that he
had no desire to have children.' 87  Similarly, the plaintiff in Blanks
admitted that he "does not want to have any more children."'818 These
admissions should not convince a court that a person's desire to
procreate is stagnant for a lifetime. For example, an immature, younger
man who is not yet married is less inclined to have children than a more
mature, older, married man, because a man is unable to bear children
by himself. Yet, even a young man retains the right to desire having
children, based on a change in his circumstances. That the major life
activity of reproduction does not exist because a man cannot reproduce
should not alone be used to extract from him an indication of his
physical desire to reproduce. Thus, where reproduction is claimed as a
major life activity, evidence of a limitation cannot be constrained to
statements indicating an objective intent, which must concede to the
logical subjective intent of humans to reproduce.' 89
The result of the holdings in Gutwaks and Blanks is that plaintiffs
are encouraged to lie about whether they intend to have children.
Testimonial evidence about the plaintiff's intention is subject to
rebuttal by witnesses who might have discussed the topic with the
'
3Id at 641.
114See Gutwaks, 1999 WL 1611328 at *4; see also Blanks, 310 F.3d at 401.
'See Furnish, 270 F.3d at 449-50.
l86Note the difference in treatment of major life activities and whether major life
activities are substantially limited. Whether a person has a major life activity is identified on
an individual level whereas the substantial limitation of a major life activity is determined on a
larger level - in comparison with the general population.
1SGutwaks, 1999 WL 1611328 at *4. See also supra notes 124-130 and accompanying
text.
'
8 Blanks, 310 F.3d at 401.
189Reproduction has long been asserted as essential to human function. For example,
Abraham Maslow identified sex as part of the physiological needs, the most basic need in his
hierarchy of needs in the human experience. ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY
OF BEING (3d ed. 1998).
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plaintiff prior to trial. This, in turn, could open the door to litigation
over matters that are less related to the plaintiff's claim of disability,
and could cause more intrusion into the Plaintiffs personal life. Thus,
a seemingly objective intent of an HIV-infected plaintiff does not lead
to a useable conclusion regarding the plaintiffs subjective intent to
reproduce.
Instead of relying on statements regarding a major life activity, the
identification of a major life activity should speak for itself.190 Since
men and women are both capable of engaging in reproduction, both
deserve equal treatment, and therefore, reproduction should always
count as a major life activity for males and females regardless of
whether an individual states a contrary intent.
b. Internal Bodily Functions Impaired by HIV Constitute a Major Life
Activity
Courts have been resistant to find that a major life activity can be
construed from an internal impairment.' 9 1  As the Furnish court
proclaimed, major life activities are "not the impairments'
characteristics-they are activities that have been impacted because of
the plaintiffs impairment."' 92 Per Furnish, even a serious illness such
that affects the functioning of a major organ does not equate with a
disability.193 This view, however, misapplies Bragdon's use of "major"
and the general understanding of "life activity." Applied correctly, in
the aggregate, HIV infection substantially limits the major life activity
of caring for one's self.
Numerous tasks are affected by HIV infection and when
considered in the aggregate, constitute a major inhibition to one's daily
existence. The ability to care for oneself, perform manual tasks, walk,
see, hear, speak, breathe, learn, and work are all potentially threatened
by HIV infection.' 94 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted in Bragdon
that HIV infection "inevitably pervades life's choices: education,
employment, family and financial undertakings."' 95 The importance of
knowing whether one's HIV infection poses a serious threat to major
190This does not mean that all persons would have the major life activity of reproduction,
however. For example, a man who had a vasectomy before knowing that he was infected with
HIV would not have the major life activity of reproduction.
191See, e.g., Furnish, 270 F.3d 445.
192Id. at 450.1931d.
194See generally 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(i)(1998).
'
95Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 656 (J.Ginsburg, concurring).
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life activities affects the vital life activity of caring for one's sel f. 196 It
is generally accepted knowledge that most people want to exist
peaceably, without the constant intrusion and frustration of debilitating
ailments. Such peace of mind is not possible for persons infected with
HIV. An infected person must arrange his or her life around combating
infection, and can only properly do so with the knowledge of a white
blood cell count. Although abstract in comparison to easily identifiable
impairments, the intrusion of HIV infection impedes daily life
existence and continuation of life, which are undeniably part of caring
for one's self and "central to the life process."1
97
It is the unknowingness in HIV infection that impedes one's
ability to exist peaceably, combined with a real and persistent fear of
contracting an infection that could result in death. Therefore, HIV
infection inhibits infected persons in two ways: first, it inhibits the
ability to care for one's self by placing an infected person at constant
risk of immune system failure, and second, it eventually inhibits
another major life activity, even if not readily apparent, which precedes
and subsequently causes death. That each person is limited differently
by HIV infection should not detract from one's desire to exist
peaceably and to care for one's self.
The Furnish court drew a distinction between activities necessary
to continue living and those that are "integral to one's daily existence"
as applied in Bragdon.'98 Recall that the Bragdon Court found that
reproduction constituted a major life activity.1 99 Reproduction, though,
is different from the list of examples used to determine whether a
claimed life activity qualifies under the ADA as a major life activity.
"Reproduction is not an activity at all, but a process.' 200 In this
context, as Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, reproduction must mean "the
numerous discrete activities that comprise the reproductive process...
,,201 Similarly, one's bodily homeostasis is comprised of several
organic and life activities. If reproduction, which comprises only a
196The EEOC has also identified additional major life activities, including: sitting,
standing, lifting, and mental and emotional processes such as thinking, concentrating, and
interacting with others." Guidance on Definition of the Term "Disability ", 2 EEOC
Compliance Manual (CCH), § 902, No. 140.177 (1995), available at
http://hr.cch.com/primesrc/bin/highwire.dll (last visited Feb. 2, 2003)(access restricted to
subscribers).
'
97Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
198Furnish, 270 F.3d at 449-50.
'
99Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.200Id. at 659, n.2.20 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued, in dissent, that reproduction was not a major life
activity.
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portion of all the body's processes is considered a major life activity, it
follows then that all of the body's processes must also constitute a
major life activity. Thus, the Furnish court limitation with regard to
liver function alone does not apply to HIV infection because a reduced
immune system has a systemic effect. Persons infected with HIV could
claim that HIV affects all of their bodily processes, which means that a
court can infer that numerous major life activities (although perhaps not
explicit at the time) will be either immediately or eventually affected.
Although the effects of HIV infection might be latent, HIV does its
bidding more deviously than obvious impairments because a person
must live day-to-day without knowing exactly how or when HIV will
progress to a more dangerous stage. To clarify, a person infected with
HIV does not merely have a possible impairment; such impairment is
eventual and certain.202  Assuming that either a physical or mental
dysfunction can affect each major life activity, and reconciling the
effect of HIV infection and immune system dysfunction on multiple
bodily organs and processes, HIV infection should be recognized as an
impediment to one's ability to care for one's self.20 3 HIV infection
threatens one's immune system, which when all the aggregate effects
thereof are considered, constitutes a limitation on the ability to care for
one's self.
c. The Sexual Dynamics Surrounding Reproduction Constitute a Major
Life Activity
The Bragdon Court found "[r]eproduction and the sexual dynamics
surrounding it are central to the life process itself."20 4 The Bragdon
Court did not define which sexual dynamics surrounding reproduction
constituted a major life activity because it did not need to, and instead
focused on whether reproduction was an applicable major life
activity. 2 5 Lower courts have not ventured into the query of which
activities are part of the sexual dynamics of reproduction.
Congress announced in 1990, "a person infected with the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus is covered under the first prong of the
definition of the term 'disability' because of a substantial limitation to
2
°
2See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 633 (stating that, "The disease follows a predictable and, as
of today, an unalterable course.").203Consider that an inability to walk is caused by dysfunctional legs, an inability to
breathe is caused by dysfunctional lungs, and an inability to take care of oneself is caused by
overwhelming physical dysfunction. Why should an inability to live a healthy life, caused by a
dysfunctional immune system, not be recognized?2
°4Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638 (emphasis added).2 51d. at 639-42.
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procreation and intimate sexual relations. ' 2°6 However, Congress also
did not explain what is meant by the term "intimate sexual relations."
Although intimate sexual relations would likely entail a broader scope
than the sexual dynamics of reproduction, since no court or legislature
has opined as to these terms, the extent of these terms is unclear. It is
apparent, through Bragdon and legislative history, that whatever
dynamics are part of intimate sexual relations or procreation are
considered a major life activity.207
The issue that must be addressed is whether the sexual dynamics
surrounding procreation are substantially limited by HIV infection.
This essay concludes that they are. Going through the triumvirate of
factors that determine whether HIV infection substantially limits the
sexual dynamics surrounding procreation is the same as if one were to
go through these factors for procreation itself. It follows, then, that the
sexual dynamics surrounding reproduction must be substantially
limited by HIV infection. The scope of the issue can be larger,
however, if one were to ask whether HIV infection substantially limits
the dynamics of intimate sexual relations not intended to result in
procreation. This question alters the analysis because sexual relations
not intended to result in procreation do not pose a risk of transmission
to offspring; rather, the risk of transmission is limited solely to sexual
partners. This change does not subtract from the significance of
transmission because the risk of transmission to a sexual partner can
never be reduced to zero.20 8 Therefore, the three-factored approach20 9
applied to the dynamics surrounding reproduction or intimate sexual
relations is substantially the same for reproduction.
Anecdotally, the dynamics surrounding intimate sexual
relationships involve issues of "how to move on and meet and develop
relationships with new people," and how to "form new relationships
that will satisfy [one's] need for both emotional and sexual
intimacy. These issues present some of the attendant long-term
issues that are more pronounced for persons living with a HIV, than for
a normal population. Thus, there is more than one way in which to
conclude that HIV infection substantially limits the major life activity
2°6H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990)(citing Application of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected Individuals, 9-11 (DEP'T OF JUST. Sept. 27, 1998)).207See supra notes 204-206 and accompanying text.
208As of the time of this essay, there is no known prophylactic device that can prevent
transmission to a sexual partner without failure.209See supra notes 156-165 and accompanying text.21 0Harvey J. Makadon, An Asymptomatic 41-Year-Old Man With HIV Infection, 281 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 739, 741 (1999).
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of the dynamics surrounding reproduction: either by analogy to
procreation, or anecdotally through examination of the lived
experiences of HIV-infected individuals.
B. Medical Evidence Demonstrates HIV Substantially Limits
Major Life Activities
Several courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have
interpreted the "substantially limits" and "major life activity"
requirements. These judicial findings; however, both for and against
these requirements are often not established on scientific evidence or
statistically significant data. Instead, courts regularly base their
reasoning upon anecdotal or testimonial evidence because that is the
evidence presented at trial. Unlike the multitude of anomalous
conditions that may render individuals disabled, HIV infection is well
documented and studied incessantly. Medical studies demonstrate that
asymptomatic HIV infection should qualify as a disability under the
ADA because the virus unavoidably substantially limits life, thus
inhibiting the major life activities associated therewith.21'
Despite any treatment options, one conclusion remains true for all
212persons infected with HIV: there is no cure. Before progressing to
the symptomatic phase of infection, "asymptomatic HIV infection is
characterized by a period of varying length in which there is a slow
deterioration of the immune system. 21 3 This period can endure for
more than ten years before a person enters the symptomatic phase of
214 Pinfection. In general, AIDS results from HIV infection. The
inevitable result is the collapse of the body's immune system, making
an individual fatally susceptible "to many infections and cancers. 21 6
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
prophetically announced in Hernandez v. Prudential Insurance
Company of America,2 17 a case decided before Bragdon, that an HIV-
positive individual "is substantially limited in his ability to care for
211The major life activity used here is one's ability to care for one's self.
2 12HEALTH CENTRAL, GENERAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (Asymptomatic HIV infection) at
http://healthcentral.com/mhc/top/000682.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
2131d"
214id"
215 Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and Related Conditions as Protected
Handicaps Under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH), OFCCP-Manual, OFCCP Appendix 6D, available at
http://hr.cch.com/primesrc/bin/highwire.dll (last visited Feb. 11, 2003) (access restricted to
subscribers).
2 16
Id.
217977 F. Supp. 1160 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
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himself, equally as unfortunate, the rest of the world is substantially
limited in its ability to care for someone infected with HIV. 218
Furthermore, the court declared: "The fact that plaintiff will need
continual medical care demonstrates that he cannot care for himself.,219
One might interpret this statement to mean that never-ending medical
treatment for HIV infection substantially limits one's major life activity
of caring for one's self. Where courts focus on a medical diagnosis,
they fail to account for the long-term effects of HIV, which include
latent medical deficiencies and medications that inevitably affect
several aspects of an HIV-infected individual's life. The myriad of
antiretroviral agents used to treat HIV infection can cause severe toxic
effects, including: pancreatitis, peripheral neuropathy, abnormal liver
function, hypersensitivity reaction, impaired concentration, insomnia,
kidney stones, and various others.220
Indeed, HIV requires continued medical treatment, 22 1 but more
importantly, the effects of treating HIV substantially limit one's ability
to care for one's self. A physician's treatment of HIV necessarily
includes a discussion of the complexity treatment poses to the infected
individual. Treating physicians are advised to discuss the "[p]otential
side effects, drug interactions, and impact of new medications on
,,222lifestyle .... Although antiretroviral therapy as well as protease
inhibitor treatment is helpful, the propensity to both cure and severely
impinge on an HIV-infected person's life presents a lesser of two evils
conundrum.223  An individual can choose either to undergo
antiretroviral therapy and risk suffering attendant side effects while
possibly not gaining the expected benefits of therapy, 224 or to forego
21"Id. at 1165.
219id
220National AIDS Treatment Information Project: Antiretroviral Therapy, at
http://www.natip.org/anti ret.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2003). Other common effects include
nausea, diarrhea, headaches, dizziness, and weakness. See id.
221 HEALTH CENTRAL, GENERAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (Asymptomatic HIV infection) at
http:/ihealthcentral.com/mhc/top/000682.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003)(stating, "HIV is a
chronic medical condition that can be treated but not yet cured.").222Harvey J. Makadon, An Asymptomatic 41-Year-Old Man With HIV Infection, 281 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 739, 739-44 (Feb. 24, 1999), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/special/hiv/library/readroom/vol_28l/jxr80010.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).223See National AIDS Treatment Information Project: Antiretroviral Therapy, at
http://www.natip.org/anti-ret.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2003)(stating that retroviral medications
"do not help everyone with HIV disease, and there remains uncertainty about how to make best
use of the available agents.").224Peter Richtig, the executive director of the AIDS Committee of Durham Region in
Oshawa, Ontario has noted that while "patients are living longer because of the efficacy of the
protease inhibitors . . . as a group, they are now more likely to get pancreatitis, diabetes and
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antiretroviral therapy at the expense of allowing the virus to run its
course, possibly in an accelerated fashion. To complicate the matter,
even a choice to use antiretroviral therapy requires a high level of
diligence because "[flrequently missed doses [of retroviral agents]
diminish their effectiveness and increase the likelihood of the virus
developing resistance." 225 Whether one chooses to use antiretroviral
therapy or not, the choice yields the same result: continued medical
treatment must go along with HIV infection. Thus, it is clear that a
physician must care for a person infected with HIV.
It would be remiss to not address the contingent slippery slope
argument against a per se finding of HIV as a disability based on
medical evidence. The opponent would argue that several diseases
require prolonged treatment, and can affect several areas of a person's
life. In rebuttal, the terms of the ADA would prohibit such an
application to diseases other than those with fatal consequences. The
severely limiting prong of the definition of disability under the ADA
should prohibit such an argument for lesser diseases, infections, and
temporary illnesses, especially those that are curable, or those without a
near absolute mortality rate. The severity of HIV infection sets it apart
from other disabling diseases, for with HIV, even fortunate individuals
who are able to persist in the asymptomatic phase for a long period of
time ("long-term non-progressors"), 226 the treatment for HIV is not a
cure.
C. Psychological Evidence Demonstrates HIV Substantially Limits
Major Life Activities
The argument that a person infected with HIV is substantially limited in
a major life activity rests on the ability to scientifically measure this
effect and report its consequences. There are two major categories of
psychological manifestations that affect an HIV-positive person's life.
The first category is comprised of an individual's self-perception and
adaptation to living with HIV infection. The second category is an
amalgam of the treatment and responses from society toward an
infected person. These categories can be thought of as going from the
inside-out and the outside-in, respectively.
227
suffer strokes and heart attacks." William Gilpin, 'Slow Progessor', 115 MACLEANS 20, 68-69
(May 20, 2002) (internal quotations omitted).2251d"
226Maggie Fox, Natural Proteins May Block AIDS, available at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/813434.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
2271 have separated these two aspects to reflect the two main types of studies that have
been performed regarding persons with HIV infection. In reality, these categories are
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Psychologists have developed coping strategies and treatments for
persons living with fatal diseases. Moreover, these techniques, which
seek to "facilitate hope, coping, and quality of life," have been
perfected for persons living with HIV infection. Treatment is needed
in order for persons -living with HIV to counter the "psychological
effects of opportunistic infections." 2 29  An HIV-infected individual
generally lives with a decreased quality of life.23° In a study comparing
the quality of life of HIV-positive persons with both a general
population and persons with other chronic conditions, this study
concluded that HIV-infected persons have a lower quality of life than
both groups. 231 Specifically, the study concluded that the emotional
well-being of HIV-infected persons was "significantly worse" than
both persons with other morbid diseases and persons in a general
population.232 Remarkably, the study found that although physical
functioning for symptomatic persons and AIDs patients was much
worse than for asymptomatic persons, when the emotional well-being
of the groups was measured, asymptornatic persons measured similarly
to symptomatic persons and AIDs patients. This finding suggested
that "there is a substantial morbidity associated with HIV disease in
adults."23
4
The finding of this experiment fits well with the constructs used to
examine the effects of a disability as intended under the ADA and
explained in III.A. 1, supra.235 To wit, the difference in quality of life
for asymptomatic HIV-infected persons from the general population
verifies that the nature and severity of HIV infection, its indefinite
duration, and long-term effects cause a substantial limitation. The
major life activities that are likely affected by this substantial limitation
are those that involve personal lifestyle choices, namely, the ability to
care for one's self and the sexual dynamics surrounding reproduction.
commingled to the extent that a person's self image is duly affected by interaction with society,
and vice-versa.
228Paul C. Veilleux, Psychological Features of Illness and Recovery Patterns in HIV
Disease, at 1, available at http://www.cpa.ca/PHASE/Recovery-pattems.PDF (Apr. 7, 2003).229Id. at 3.
230Ron D. Hays et al., Health-related quality of life in patients with human
immunodeficiency virus infection in the United States: results from the HIV cost and services
utilization study, 108 AM. J. MED. 714, 714-22 (June 15, 2000).2311d"
2321d. The only sub-group measuring comparable to persons with HIV infection was
persons with depression.2 3
31d.
234Id.
235See supra notes 149-159 and accompanying text for a detailed explanation of this
mechanism.
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These major life activities have been linked to chronic illness quality of
life modeling.236 Tracing the effect of HIV infection leads to a result
confirming a substantial limitation on a major life activity. In sum,
HIV-infected persons experience specific, identifiable psychological
effects. Although multivariate, these effects result in a measurable,
substantial decrease in quality of life. A substantial decrease in quality
of life, in turn, affects the major life activities of caring for one's self,
as well as the sexual dynamics surrounding reproduction. Therefore,
there is a pronounced psychological experience for persons living with
HIV, which substantially limits a major life activity.
The other half of this argument, that society's adverse reaction to
HIV-infected individuals results in a substantial limitation on a major
life activity, has been documented. Congress has recognized a similar
result for disabled persons, in general.237 While many reports regarding
the life experiences of HIV-positive persons have been anecdotal or
focused on specific sub-groups, a 2001 study by Bridget Taylor put all
prior theories in perspective.2 38  Taylor concluded that "the stigma
experienced is unique to each individual and changes dynamically
throughout the course of the HIV illness trajectory." 239  From a
historical perspective, stigmatization of HIV-infected persons is
instigating by having a disease "whose cause is uncertain and whose
treatment is limited." 2 40 This stigma has been explained as making an
infected person who should be treated equally, as someone who is
"sinful" or "evil.",2 4 ' The result of this stigma can be a substantial
limitation in social interaction, affecting both the ability to care for
one's self and also affecting the sexual dynamics surrounding
reproduction. While asymptomatic HIV can be hidden, substantial
limitations occur because where "the potential for felt stigma [exists],
236See Timothy G. Heckman, The chronic illness quality of life (CIQOL) model:
Explaining life satisfaction in people living with HIV disease, 22 HEALTH PSYCHOL., 140-47
(Mar. 2003) ("The chronic illness quality of life (CIQOL) model theorizes that life satisfaction
in persons living with chronic illnesses such as HIV disease is a function of illness-related
discrimination, barriers to health care and social services, physical well-being, social support,
and coping.").37 See generally H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 41 (1990) (stating: "The social
consequences that have attached to being disabled often bear no relationship to the physical or
mental limitations imposed by the disability.").238Bridget Taylor, HIV, stigma and health: integration of theoretical concepts and the
lived experiences of individuals, 35 J. ADVANCED NURSING 792 (2001).
2401d. at 794 (citing S. SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR. AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS
(1991)). Taylor notes that where tuberculosis once met these criteria it was later replaced by
cancer and, more recently, HIV.241id"
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concealment become[s] the defence [sic] against enacted stigma. ' '242 In
turn, persons who hide their HIV-positive status to avoid social
rejection suffer from a fear of being doomed.243
IV. IMPACT
Congress affirmed that within the intended scope of the ADA,
"[a]ll persons with symptomatic or asymptomatic HIV infection should
be clearly included as persons with disabilities who are covered by the
anti-discrimination protections of this legislation.'"244 Courts have not
fully adhered to this intent, depriving some HIV-positive individuals of
the protections of the ADA. Aside from people who do not want to
have children, and homosexuals, who presumably will not have
children, certain other classes of persons are likely to be denied
coverage under the ADA. Additional groups who will likely be
affected based on the holdings of Gutwaks and Blanks are: children,245
the elderly, and inmates. All of these groups share in common the
unlikelihood or impossibility of having children.
The Blanks decision falls short of Congress's intended scope of
the ADA, and poses a continuing threat to all asymptomatic HIV-
infected individuals. Likewise, the Blanks court attempted to transform
the universal capability to bear children into a fact-specific evidentiary
matter, turning on a chimeral showing that "an HIV-positive person...
is substantially limited in the major life activity of reproduction. ' '246 As
argued in this essay, such a showing is not necessary because the stated
intent to not engage in reproduction is inextricably reached in light of
one's HIV status, social factors, and unknown medical factors, which
override and limit several major life activities, including reproduction.
Future cases that address the issue of disability status for younger
persons, who do not have a clear intent, as well as homosexuals, who
are not likely to have the required intent to engage in procreation, will
further highlight this issue. Regardless, substantial limitations based on
reproduction are not the end of the matter.
2421d. Taylor explains that, "'Felt' and 'enacted' stigma are powerful forces in the way
that society and individuals interrelate." Taylor, supra note 238, at 797.2431Id. at 795.
244H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 47 (1990) (citing REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY EPIDEMIC, at 123 (June 1998)).245Happy Time Day Care Center found that children with HIV were disabled per se, but
was a pre-Bragdon decision. See Happy Time Day Care, 6 F.Supp. 2d at 1077, 1081 (stating, in
the symptomatic phase of HIV, "an inference could be drawn that HIV substantially limited [a
child's] ability to care for himself.").24 6Blanks, 310 F.3d at 401.
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Future cases that face the challenge of determining whether a
person in a group lacks protection of the ADA must also decide
whether caring for one's self and the sexual dynamics surrounding
intimate sexual relationships are valid major life activities substantially
limited by HIV infection, even in its medicated state. The Supreme
Court has recognized the concept of a per se disability, but has not
ruled any specific condition to be disabling per se. In cases involving
persons with HIV infection, the reality is that whether a disability is
found in the asymptomatic or symptomatic phase is a temporal
distinction. The onset of symptomatic HIV is only a matter of time.
247
The benefits to both asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals and
agencies affected by ADA regulations are apparent. If HIV infection
were regarded as a disability per se:
[t]his would make it easier to obtain voluntary compliance
with ADA requirements by covered entities, because both the
covered entity and the individual with the condition would
know up front that there is no possibility that an
administrative enforcement agency or a court could rule that
the condition does not meet the ADA definition.248
In addition to certainty, the litigation costs of determining an HIV-
positive person's status would be spared.
The court system has failed to keep up with the HIV crisis in the
United States, whereas scientific and social scientists have documented
and reported the impact of HIV.249 Commentators on the evolution of
the HIV epidemic conclude that the legal system fails to recognize
several aspects of the effects of HIV.250  Similarly, courts must
recognize the status of asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals as
disabled in order to comport with Congress's intended scope of
coverage under the ADA. Whether the major life activity of
reproduction or prospectively caring for one's self or the sexual
247See supra notes 212-216 and accompanying text.248NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, POLICY BRIEF SERIES: RIGHTING THE ADA: No. 12
The Supreme Court's ADA Decisions and Per Se Disabilities available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/persedisabilities.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).249See supra notes 211-243 and accompanying text.25
°See Caroline Palmer and Lynn Mickelson, Many Rivers to Cross: Evolving and
Emerging Legal Issues in the Third Decade of the HIVIAIDS Epidemic, 28 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 455, 461 (2001) (stating, "despite gains through legislation, case law, public education,
the expansion of HIV/AIDS service organizations, the broad range of treatment options, the
increased availability of needle exchange programs, and the work of AIDS activist groups, the
legal system still struggles to catch up to the crisis.").
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dynamics surrounding intimate sexual relationships is asserted, HIV
infection has a profound impact on one's life.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the limitation on disability status for persons with
asymptomatic HIV infection affects only a small population, it is an
onerous conundrum with a possibly devastating result. Persons
susceptible to preclusion from the protection of the ADA face a
confounding problem: they must live with HIV while being denied the
benefits of disabled status, which is granted to similarly situated
persons living with HIV. As the number of persons with HIV
infections increases, this problem will become more evident and courts
willing to rightfully grant disability status to all asymptomatic HJV-
infected persons will have to break from current precedent to realize
Congress's intent for the ADA. Hopefully, courts will either be
pressured to confront the issue or will face insurmountable evidence
categorizing the impact of HIV impact on all persons, whether
symptomatic or asymptomatic. While the designation of HIV as a per
se disability would be an extraordinary development, it should not be
confused to mean that a multitude of other diseases would equally
qualify for similar status. On the contrary, granting disability status per
se for all persons with HIV infection would aid the legal system to
reflect properly the modem scientific and social understanding of the
result of living with HIV.
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